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.1. Introduction
This paper introduces a novel methodology for analyzing the political viability of alternative reso-
lutions to complex policy problems. To illustrate our approach, we examine in detail a particular
natural resource management controversy. In principle, our methodology could be applied to a much
larger class of problems, such as climate change, health-care, etc. Typically, in such contexts, much
more is known about the scienti￿c, engineering, institutional and economic aspects of the problem
than about the complex, relatively unstructured political terrain within which con￿icts will have to
be resolved. For this reason, our methodology exploits the detailed information available about the
former aspects, while adopting a minimalist approach to the latter aspect. Rather than imposing
a speci￿c political structure on the problem, we assess the political viability of policy options by
examining whether or not they satisfy a rather weak criterion that is a necessary condition for a
broad class of solution concepts.
The probabilistic political viability methodology is designed to analyze speci￿c, one-time policy
negotiations, involving tradeo￿s between economic and environmental objectives, market and non-
market valuations, and private and public goods. In such contexts, the problems associated with
constructing a model are particularly challenging. The complexities really matter: it is important
to model the interconnected economic, social, and ecosystem impacts of the various policy options
under consideration. Our approach must be more ￿ne-grained than models that use econometric
techniques to identify broad regularities linking processes to outcomes; the more we abstract from the
idiosyncratic details of a problem, the less credible will be the model’s probabilistic predictions. This
leads to models that are too complex to be solved analytically. As a result, the methodology uses
simulation methods to predict outcomes and conduct comparative statics analysis. Moreover, trying
to predict exactly what policy will emerge is too ambitious a goal; instead, we seek to identify policies
that meet a coarser ￿political viability￿ criterion. Finally, when modeling complex, unique policy
debates, it is virtually impossible to assemble a database rich enough that econometric techniques
can be used to estimate model parameters. Since we cannot have con￿dence in any particular
parameterization of the model and must utilize numerical rather than analytical comparative statics
methods, we study the properties of the model under the widest possible range of plausible parameter
speci￿cations. We then assess the likelihood that any particular policy option will be politically
viable based on a speci￿ed viability criterion.We apply this methodology to the debate over the future of California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. At present, this debate centers around two critical questions: ￿rst, how much water can be
exported from the Delta watershed without violating the economic and ecological integrity of the
Delta, and second, should the state build a conveyance structure that would deliver water from the
Sacramento River directly to diversion pumps, avoiding the Delta entirely? Opinions are sharply
divided, and stakeholder groups have di￿erent concerns. Agricultural and urban users of exported
water are concerned about the economic impacts of reduced supplies. Many environmentalists are
focused on ecological e￿ects, including the implications for threatened and endangered species. Delta
residents and growers are concerned about its economic and ecological integrity. Some policymakers
have expressed concern regarding the potential costs for taxpayers. The diversity of stakeholder
interests is not the only challenge for reaching agreement. Water policy in California has had a
long and tangled history, including many failed attempts to obtain consensus and form institutions
to implement agreements. Consistent with this history, one of the obstacles to reaching a solution
regarding water exports and the Delta is that key stakeholder groups have expressed serious mistrust
in the institutions that would implement any solution.
We investigate the political viability of possible solutions to the Delta crisis and the impact of
institutional mistrust on that viability. There has been extensive analysis of the environmental and
economic consequences of various Delta alternatives (Lund et al., 2007, 2008; Cooley et al., 2008) and
some rankings of these alternatives based on a variety of ￿nancial and non-￿nancial criteria (Lund
et al., 2008). Hanemann & Dyckman (2009) and Madani & Lund (2011b) conclude that stakeholders
are unlikely to agree on an alternative in the absence of credible government intervention or a
substantial worsening of the current situation. Although Madani & Lund (2011a) conclude that
the construction of a conveyance facility to convey water exports around the Delta might emerge as
an equilibrium, their analysis strongly suggests that parties may be unable to agree upon a solution,
in which case the status quo will prevail.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our probabilistic political viability methodol-
ogy. Section 3 presents the details of the Delta application and constructs a formal model of that
political process, which is then embedded within the probabilistic political viability methodology.
Section 4, presents the results and discusses their signi￿cance for both the Delta application and
our methodology. It ￿rst establishes that for the range of parameterizations of the Delta problem
-2-that we consider, certain alternatives would be ￿robustly politically viable,￿ if all stakeholder groups
trusted that these alternatives would be implemented in accordance with negotiated guidelines.
It then examines how the political viability of these alternatives changes as institutional mistrust
increases. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Probabilistic Political Viability Methodology
This section introduces the Probabilistic Political Viability methodology (PPV). The methodology
begins with a predictive political economic model that has four basic components: a set of policy
options; a set of stakeholders or participants in the process; a political prediction mapping from pol-
icy options via outcomes to stakeholder expected utilities; and a prediction concept. The prediction
concept selects policy options that meet a certain political viability criterion, based on the expected
utilities that stakeholders assign to these options. Subsection 2.2 formally speci￿es the components
of a predictive political economic model. The PPV methodology then incorporates the researcher’s
lack of information about how to parameterize the model, as described in later subsections.
2.1. Exogenous variables. Each exogenous variable in our model is classi￿ed either as a param-
eter, a state-dependent variable or a policy. The term parameter refers to any exogenous variable
whose value is known by stakeholders. We denote by Z the space of all parameter vectors, with
generic element z. Conventionally, a state of the world refers to a ￿move by nature￿ (Rasmusen,
2007, p.54). Here we use the term ￿state of the world￿ very broadly to encompass any component
of the model about which stakeholders are uncertain, including ones that are not usually thought
of as being determined by nature, such as certain random aspects of the mapping from policies to
outcomes and the default outcomes.1 The set of possible states of the world is given by S  R, with
generic element s. For every model variable classi￿ed as state dependent, we specify a probability
distribution f (s;zs) over the states of the world that represent stakeholders’ uncertainty about it.
The parameters governing these distributions are given by a subvector zs of z. Finally, there is a
policy space X  R2, with generic element x, consisting of a set of possible policy options.
1Stakeholders face unpredictability in the traditional sense, i.e., Knightian risk: they know the probability distribu-
tions over which they must take expectations. In reality, however, there is no bright line distinction between Knightian
risk and uncertainty. Rather, these concepts should be thought of as extreme points of a conceptual continuum, along
which our stakeholders’ unknowns are dispersed.
-3-2.2. A Political Prediction Mapping. Stakeholders derive expected utilities not from a partic-
ular policy per se, but from the range of possible outcomes that might be induced if this policy were
implemented. We thus de￿ne a mapping from ZSX to the outcome space Y  Rm. An element
y 2 Y is called an outcome vector, while the components of y will be referred to simply as outcomes.
The speci￿cation of this mapping includes a number of outcome parameters, whose values are given
by the subvector zy of z. The outcome of policy x conditional on state of the world s and outcome
parameter vector zy is denoted by y(x;s;zy).
Each participant in the political process has a utility function de￿ned over outcomes; zu is a sub-
vector of utility parameters specifying stakeholders’ preferences. The vector u(y(x;s;zy);zu) enu-
merates the utilities of all stakeholders resulting from policy in state s, given parameter subvectors
zy and zu. Stakeholders maximize expected utility, taking expectations over possible states of the
world. A composite vector z =
 
zy;zu;zs;zd
includes the three parameter subvectors, plus a




A predictive political economic model is represented by a political prediction mapping W : Z ! X.
Given a parameterization z 2 Z of the model, W(z) is the model’s prediction of which element (or
elements) from X are ￿politically viable,￿ in a sense to be described below.
The typical approach to political economic modeling is to isolate an alternative or set of alternatives
that solves the model using the speci￿ed solution concept. However, a starting point for this paper is
the infeasibility of isolating a single model that best represents a given complex real-world political
process. Therefore, the political prediction correspondence maps not to the outcome identi￿ed
by applying any one particular solution concept, but rather to a set of policies that satisfy some
criterion for political viability. For the purposes of this paper we use a relatively weak criterion:
Pareto dominance. Given a ￿default outcome￿ that will be implemented if the participants in
the political process cannot negotiate an agreement, W(z) is the set of alternatives that Pareto
dominate this outcome when the model is parameterized by z. This criterion is a necessary condition
-4-for a large class of political economic solution concepts; in any model requiring consensus among
some set of players, Pareto dominance is a necessary condition for a policy to be a solution. 2
The default outcome is denoted by yd  
s;zd
, where zd is a subvector of parameters that relate to
this outcome. The dependence of yd on s re￿ects the possibility that stakeholders may be uncertain
about what will happen in the absence of an agreement. The vector of expected default utilities is:











Note that by de￿nition this vector is independent of every non-default policy x in X. The Pareto
dominance political prediction mapping is speci￿ed as:
(3) W(z) =
n
x 2 X : Eui (x;z)  Eud
i (z) for all i
o
:
2.3. Probabilistic Political Viability. Each realization z 2 Z corresponds to a speci￿c parame-
terization of the model in which stakeholders have uncertainty only about the realized state of the
world; the associated political prediction of the model is W(z). While stakeholders know the value
of z, the modeler does not. To incorporate this lack of knowledge into our methodology, we model
the components of z as stochastic; we de￿ne a random vector ~ z 2 Z with density function h(~ z),
representing epistemic uncertainty about the true value of z. We use the term modeling uncertainty
to refer to our lack of information about how best to model, and then parameterize, the political-
economic environment that we wish to study.3 This approach allows us to study the sensitivity of
our political prediction mapping, W(), to the particular parameterization of the problem.
2As a criterion for political viability, Pareto dominance has an obvious shortcoming: each stakeholder in the model
is assumed to have veto power over the decision-making process. In this respect, our notion of political viability is a
￿awed representation of virtually every actual political process: either it endows some modeled stakeholders with more
power than they actually have, or it excludes from the model stakeholders who, though lacking veto power, may have
considerable political in￿uence. In the former instance, the set of politically viable options will be underestimated;
an option can fail to meet our criterion because it is unacceptable to some stakeholder that in the real world would
lack the political clout to block it. In the latter instance, the set will be overestimated; it will include policy options
that are acceptable to all of the stakeholders with veto power, but in the real world would not survive the combined
opposition of multiple stakeholders, none of whom had the political power to veto the outcome unilaterally. It is
nonetheless a helpful exercise to identify the Pareto dominant set. In particular, as we shall demonstrate in section
3 below, it can be especially instructive to learn that certain highly publicized possibilities fail to satisfy even this
relatively modest selection criterion.
3The very similar term ￿model uncertainty￿ is widely associated with the work of Hansen & Sargent (2001), which
builds on work by Gilboa & Schmeidler (1989) and others. Gilboa et al. (2008) provides an accessible overview. This
literature is motivated by a problem very similar to the one that we confront: how to deal with situations where
probabilities are unknowable. However, they focus on the question of how to optimize an objective function in this
context; we eschew optimization altogether, instead attempting to isolate potential solutions that satisfy a weak
necessary condition for optimality.
-5-To study the role of modeling uncertainty, we de￿ne a probabilistic political viability function V : X !
[0;1], where V (x) is the probability computed over possible realizations of modeling uncertainty
that policy x satis￿es our viability criterion, i.e., Pareto dominates the default. Formally,
(4) V (x) = PrZ (x 2 W(z))
We partition the policy space into ￿more likely￿ and ￿less likely￿ regions to summarize the in-
formation provided by our viability function. Formally, for some K, we specify a K-vector  of
probability threshholds, where 0 = 1 < k < K < 1, and for each k, de￿ne a ￿more likely￿ region
C+
k = fx 2 X : V (x) > kg and a ￿less likely￿ region C 
k = fx 2 X : V (x)  kg. C+
k and C 
k are,
respectively, the upper- and lower-contour sets of V corresponding to k. Under Pareto dominance,
C+
k contains all policies that Pareto dominate the default for some fraction exceeding k of possible
realizations of modeling uncertainty. We will say that a policy in the ￿highest￿ upper-contour set
C+
k is robustly politically viable; for a policy with this designation, we can have a high degree of
con￿dence that its political viability is not highly sensitive to speci￿c model parameterizations.
Conversely, a policy in the ￿lowest￿ lower-contour set C 
1 will be called never politically viable; we
can be highly con￿dent that a policy in this category will not survive the political process, regardless
of speci￿c model parameterizations.
Our approach is closely related to the ￿robust decisionmaking￿ approach developed to evaluate prob-
lems characterized by ￿deep uncertainty.￿ Deep uncertainty refers to situations where the researcher
or a￿ected parties cannot agree on how to characterize the problem in question in one or more
of the following ways: the appropriate set of conceptual relationships de￿ning the problem and
potential solutions, the probability distributions that represent uncertainty about key relationships
and parameters, and/or the desirability of alternative outcomes (Lempert, 2002). 4 In robust deci-
sionmaking, computer simulations are used to generate a large ensemble of outcomes, each based
on a speci￿c model. Rather than interpreting the results using summary statistics of realized out-
comes, as one would in a Monte Carlo setting, the results are interpreted as representing modeling
uncertainty. If a potential solution performs well for a substantial share of the simulations, then
it is deemed robust. Lempert (2002) argues that robust decisionmaking does not need to be based
4Deep uncertainty is closely related to the distinction between situations of "risk" and of "uncertainty" introduced
to economists by Frank Knight.
-6-on a model known to make reliable forecasts. Rather, the model must be capable of identifying
key players, relationships, and potential states of the world well enough to identify which potential
strategies are likely to fare well under a wide range of speci￿cations. At the same time, the potential
values of the individual elements of each speci￿cation are limited to realistic ranges (Lempert, 2002).
These ranges can be de￿ned using expert opinion or other information. 5
Our probabilistic political viability approach follows the same logic. In our political economic
context, just as in a decision-theoretic context, the value of a single optimal solution based on a
single model speci￿cation is less useful, the more sensitive is the model outcome to uncertainty
regarding the model speci￿cation (Lempert et al. (2006)). In complicated problems, an appropriate
model may be su￿ciently complex that a single speci￿cation cannot be useful because the e￿ects
of the many assumptions it incorporates cannot be disentangled from each other. Furthermore,
probabilities play two distinct roles in both approaches; ￿rst, the conventional one of representing
the likelihood of realizations of states of the world, or known uncertainty; second, the provision of a
framework for summarizing information about the e￿ect of modeling uncertainty on the performance
of speci￿c policies according to speci￿c criteria (Lempert et al., 2004).
Our approach is related as well to the ￿robust control￿ and the ￿info-gap￿ literatures, although less
closely. Robust control is a means of modeling ambiguity-averse preferences (Hansen & Sargent,
2001). Due to the limits of knowledge regarding the factors driving species survival, among other
considerations, robust control is a natural choice for modeling many natural resource problems,
including extractive ￿sheries and water allocation (Shaw & Woodward, 2008). Info-gap theory
is designed to identify policies that decisionmakers can be con￿dent will meet an acceptability
criterion (Ben-Haim, 2006). In both literatures, the goal is to identify a single policy that meets an
optimality criterion designed to address the well-known problems associated with decisionmaking
under Knightian uncertainty (See Ellsberg, 1961; Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989). Our stakeholders face
unpredictability in the traditional sense, i.e., Knightian risk: they know the probability distributions
over which they must take expectations.6 Because of this, the issues associated with Knightian
uncertainty ￿ambiguity aversion, etc.; seeGilboa et al. (2008) for a summary￿do not arise.
5Methodologically, robust decisionmaking is very closely related to multi-model analysis and perturbed physics anal-
ysis, which have been used extensively to model climate change, among other applications (For examples of this
literature, see Murphy et al. (2004); Piani et al. (2005); Stainforth et al. (2005); Rougier (2007); Dessai et al. (2009)).
6There is no bright line distinction between Knightian risk and uncertainty. Rather, these concepts should be thought
of as extreme points of a conceptual continuum, along which our stakeholders’ unknowns are dispersed.
-7-2.4. Simulation Approach. For complex policy problems it is virtually impossible to express in
tractable analytical form the key elements of the predictive political model, in particular, y(),
W() and V(). Accordingly, we assign speci￿c functional forms to y() and u() and to the
distributions over S and Z . We de￿ne the parameter space Z to be a hypercube. Lacking any basis
on which to rank the relative likelihoods of alternative parameterizations, we invoke the principle of
insu￿cient reason (Sinn, 1980) and assume that the elements of the random parameter vector ~ z are
independently and uniformly distributed. That is, for each dimension of ~ z we specify an interval
wide enough to include all values of the component that we consider to be plausible, and then assume
that each value in that interval is equally likely to be realized. Let f() denote the (constant) density
de￿ned on Z. For each realization of ~ z with distribution parameter subvector zs, the distribution
over states of the world has density h(;zs). Once again, we assume that h(;zs) is a constant; the
subvector zs determines the supports of the various random variables. Now, for each z 2 Z (the
￿outer loop￿), we compute players’ payo￿s for each policy in X and for the default outcome for each
realization s 2 S (the ￿inner loop￿). We then take expectations over S to identify the PD set for
the realization z. This approach provides a comprehensive picture of political viability across the
entire spectrum of plausible parameter con￿gurations through the probabilistic viability function
V () and its associated upper and lower contour sets C+
k and C 
k ,. In the following two sections,
we apply this methodology to a speci￿c policy problem, and study W() and V() in that context.
3. The Delta Application
The case study in this section illustrates the PPV methodology developed in Section 2. This case
study presents all of the issues discussed in the introduction. The problem is exceedingly complex
and multi-faceted. There is a diverse set of stakeholders whose con￿icting, non-comparable interests
cannot be balanced against each other using conventional utilitarian principles. The issues that arise
involve market and non-market goods, privately owned and common-pool resources, and an intricate
mix of economic, environmental and engineering objectives. There is a great deal of exogenous
uncertainty. The scienti￿c relationships between key variables are imperfectly understood. For these
reasons, it is appropriate to search among potential resolutions for ones whose political viability is
robust with respect to a wide array of possible characterizations of the political situation.
-8-3.1. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. The Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta is the con￿uence
of two large river systems draining California’s Central Valley: the Sacramento in the north and the
San Joaquin in the south.Settlement has changed the Delta from a marshy region of shifting channels
and salinity to a series of levee-protected islands surrounded by ￿xed channels. The vast majority
of San Joaquin River water is diverted upstream. Large quantities of Sacramento River water are
also diverted upstream. A substantial portion of the water that does reach the Delta is then pulled
south, against natural ￿ow patterns, to large pumping plants and exported to agricultural users in
the San Joaquin Valley and urban users in Southern California and the Bay Area. The salinity of
the Delta is carefully regulated to protect the quality of water exports.
Today, the Delta is widely acknowledged to be in crisis. The region serves two critical needs for
California: ecosystem services and water infrastructure. While there has always been some tension
between these goals, the con￿ict between them has intensi￿ed in recent years. Fish populations
have crashed, and ￿ve species are listed as threatened or endangered. Lawsuits ￿led under the
Endangered Species Act (ESA) have led to dramatic cuts in water exports(United States District
Court, 2007), which in turn have contributed to rising unemployment rates in many agricultural
regions reliant on the Delta for water.
The Delta also faces a substantial risk of levee failure. The aging levees protecting Delta islands are
at risk from isolated failures and catastrophic simultaneous failures perhaps due to earthquakes on
the region’s faults. In the event of massive failure, water would rush in to ￿ll the levee lined islands
and saline water from San Francisco Bay would be drawn into the Delta, making its water un￿t
for drinking, agricultural production, and important ￿sh species. The consequences for California’s
residents would be enormous; nearly two-thirds of the state’s residents rely on the Delta for drinking
water. A major levee breach is predicted to cost between $8 and $15 billion (Lund et al., 2008).
3.2. Proposed solutions. Several independent studies have considered how the state should re-
spond to this crisis (Bay Delta Conservation Plan, 2007, 2009; Blue Ribbon Task Force, 2007, 2008;
Cooley et al., 2008; Delta Vision Committee, 2008; Lund et al., 2007, 2008). The Lund et al. (2008)
report has been particularly in￿uential and our analysis draws heavily on it. Its authors argue that
there are four basic strategies available to the government: stop exporting water from the Delta
altogether, invest in reinforcing the Delta’s levees and continue exporting water through it, build a
-9-canal or other isolated conveyance system to carry exports around the Delta, or combine the last
two alternatives in a dual conveyance system where some water is exported through the Delta and
some around it in a canal.
The ￿rst strategy, stopping all exports, would have sweeping consequences. Agricultural and urban
interests currently reliant on the Delta for water would need to reduce their water use, ￿nd alternate
sources of supply, or do some of both. Water conservation, land fallowing, wastewater recovery, and
desalination would all likely play major roles in the adaptation. Each of these responses would be
extremely costly; Lund et al. (2008) estimate that stopping all water exports through the Delta
would cost between $1.5 and $2.5 billion per year. While this strategy would likely be the best
option from an ecosystem prospective, it is important to recognize that even stopping all exports
would not guarantee the recovery of endangered ￿sh populations.
The second strategy is to reinforce the levee structure in the Delta while continuing to export water
through it. This strategy is appealing in that it does not require the construction of new conveyance
infrastructure, which would have a high price tag and might not resolve the Delta’s problems. Water
managers would continue policies designed to keep the Delta’s salinity below speci￿ed targets. Given
the current risk of levee failure, a through-Delta strategy would require substantial investments in
levee upgrades. However, most engineers believe that it would be impossible to eliminate the risk
of catastrophic levee failure. As a result, choosing a through-Delta strategy implies accepting some
degree of failure risk. Moreover, most ecologists believe that such a system is likely to be the worst
of the four alternatives from an ecosystem perspective.
The third strategy is to build a canal, tunnel or other isolated conveyance system around the Delta.
For brevity we use ￿canal￿ to represent an isolated conveyance structure, whatever its form. 7 Today,
all the water that reaches the lower end of the Sacramento River ￿ows into the Delta. By exporting
water around the Delta instead of through it, only water not destined for export would ￿ow into
the Delta. A canal would insulate the state’s water supply from the risk of levee failure. It would
be expensive to construct, but water users have pledged to pay for it in exchange for the security
it o￿ers. Although controversial, many biologists believe that such a system would be better for
7The idea of a tunnel (or pair of tunnels) rather than a surface canal is a relatively recent one (Bay Delta Conservation
Plan, 2010, p. 35). While there are important di￿erences between the two systems, they are second order relative to
the considerations discussed in this paper. In what follows, we use the word ￿canal￿ as shorthand for ￿some surface
or underground conveyance system that is isolated from the Delta itself.￿
-10-the region’s ecosystem than the status quo, despite the lower quantities of fresh water that would
￿ow into the Delta. Several ecosystem impacts would be reduced under this strategy. In particular,
it would eliminate the ￿￿ow reversals￿ that occur when the export pumps draw water against its
natural ￿ow patterns and would probably reduce the impact of ESA restrictions on pumping at
certain times of the year. It would also eliminate the need to regulate the salinity of the Delta as
water would enter the canal upstream from the Delta. However, in-Delta interests are worried about
the impact of these lower in￿ows on Delta water quality. Moreover, many groups, particularly in-
Delta interests and some environmental groups have expressed concern that the institutions charged
with managing the conveyance system might eventually bow to political pressure to renege on agreed
upon limits on canal usage.
The ￿nal strategy is to combine the previous two: export some water through a canal and some
through the Delta. Many believe that this strategy, known as ￿dual conveyance,￿ could represent the
best of both worlds: maintaining in￿ows to the Delta and therefore maintaining its water quality,
providing the ￿exibility to route exports in the least harmful fashion at any particular point in time,
and providing a secure export option in the event of levee failure. Others fear that it could be the
worst of both worlds: expensive to construct and not guaranteeing either ecosystem health or water
supply reliability by failing to separate these functions.
Opinions about how to proceed are varied. Supporters of a canal and/or dual-conveyance option
include Arnold Schwarzenegger and Jerry Brown, California’s past and present governors, an inde-
pendent group of experts, many water export users, the Bay-Delta Conservation Plan committee,
and the Nature Conservancy. Opponents include farmers, local residents and recreational users
within the Delta (henceforth referred to collectively as ￿in-Delta interests￿) and some Northern Cal-
ifornia residents. Many environmental groups are withholding judgment but have indicated that if
appropriate safeguards were guaranteed a canal might be part of a workable solution. The main
source of concern among environmental groups is that the canal will not be operated in accordance
with environmental protection laws and the Endangered Species Act (ESA). These groups have
expressed a fundamental lack of trust in existing water management institutions, noting that these
are the same institutions that failed to prevent the current crisis. The situation is evolving rapidly
as analysis of the various options and plans continues. (See, for example, National Research Council
-11-(2011).) We construct a probabilistic political viability model of the political debate over the future
of the Delta in order to assess the political viability of the various options on the table.
3.3. A Probabilistic Political Viability Model of the Delta. This subsection embeds a com-
putable model of the policy options facing California into the framework introduced in Section 2.
Given the complexity of the choices, the full speci￿cation is quite detailed. This section provides a
sketch of the entire model and focuses on the features that are critical for the results. The technical
appendix, available on request, provides a complete description of the model’s functional forms and
parameter speci￿cations.
Following Lund et al. (2008), we focus on two policy choices: how much water to export and
how to convey it. Our model includes ￿ve broadly speci￿ed stakeholder groups: urban users of
exported water, the agricultural regions of the San Joaquin Valley that rely on exported water,
environmentalists, state taxpayers, and in-Delta interests. These groups have con￿icting concerns
about the ￿nancial, ecological, and employment impacts of the possible options available to the
government. Politically, it would be very di￿cult to impose a solution to the Delta’s problems over
the vigorous objections of any one of them.8 To the extent that each of these groups possesses some
degree of veto power over the ￿nal solution, our political viability criterion￿Pareto dominance￿is a
necessary condition for a solution to be sustainable.9 Indeed, Sacramento Bee political reporter Dan
Walters has commented on the ￿unwritten rule￿ that ￿any major policy decree must have virtually
unanimous support from every stakeholder group or it will ultimately fail because opponents have
so many political ways to kill it￿ (Walters, 2010).
3.3.1. Policy Choices. A policy in our model is represented by a pair (xex;xshr) 2 X  R2
+, where
xex is the total amount of water exported and xshr is the share of exports routed around the Delta
through a canal. We let xex vary from zero to 7.5 million acre feet (maf)10 and let xs vary from
zero to one. Prior to the court mandated cutbacks, exports averaged approximately 6 maf; we refer
to this as the pre-2007 export level. The size of the canal constructed is not a a policy choice in
8There is another interest group that has some degree of veto power: agricultural users upstream of the Delta. We
have omitted them because of lack of data. It is less clear that the in-Delta interests have real veto power over Delta
solutions, but they are certainly a vocal interest group exerting substantial in￿uence over the process.
9In their analysis of the Delta, Madani & Lund (2011a) consider six game-theoretic solution concepts: a necessary
condition for a policy to solve any one of their games is that it (weakly) Pareto dominates the status quo.
10Lund et al. (2008) identify 7.6 maf as the maximum level of exports consistent with minimum ￿ow constraints on
the Sacramento River.
-12-Table 1. Costs of Various Export Regimes and how they are allocated
Cost Allocation Dependence on Export Regime
Reduced exports Agricultural and urban water users Increases as total exports decline
Water treatment Agricultural and urban water users Increases as total amount of water exported
through Delta increases
Levee maintenance Primarily taxpayers; also agricultural
and urban water users
Increases as total amount of water exported
through Delta increases
Repair Taxpayers Constant, but only paid if no canal is built,
either initially or after disaster
Canal Construction Mostly water users; also taxpayers Constant for any level of canal exports; also
paid if canal is built following collapse
Collapse Water users and taxpayers Constant, but only paid if no canal is built
our model; we assume that if constructed, a canal will be sized based on engineering considerations
as recommended by Lund et al. (2008). Each of the solutions identi￿ed in Lund et al. (2008) can
be represented as a speci￿c point in X. Our parameterization is self-explanatory for each of the
strategies except the dual-conveyance alternative. Because the report does not include a precise
description of how a dual-conveyance plan would allocate exports between the canal and through-
Delta pumping, we represent the dual conveyance alternative by dividing exports evenly between
the two; other values of xshr would correspond to di￿erent dual conveyance alternatives.
3.3.2. Outcomes. Each policy vector is mapped to a stochastic outcome vector which represents
the payo￿-relevant consequences of implementing that vector. Many of these outcomes are ￿nan-
cial. Di￿erent export regimes impose di￿erent types of costs that are shared among three of our
stakeholder groups: agricultural users and urban users that rely on Delta exports for some of their
water, and the taxpayers. The model includes ￿ve speci￿c costs: costs due to reduced water exports,
water treatment costs, levee maintenance costs, repair costs following a major collapse, and costs
associated with a major collapse of the levee system.11 Table 1 summarizes the allocation of these
costs and the key pathways through which the policy vector x in￿uences them. Several of the costs
are borne only in the event that a canal either is or is not constructed. As a result, our mapping
from policies to outcomes is discontinuous as we move from xshr = 0 to xshr > 0. This discontinuity
induces discontinuities in stakeholder preferences that are discussed in section 4.
11The costs included in the cost of a levee collapse are the costs of a sudden disruption of water supplies during
the transition period until either the levees are repaired or a canal is constructed. They do not cover all potential
consequences of a collapse, most importantly the costs to in-Delta interests of a catastrophic collapse. In-Delta
concerns about costs associated with levee collapse are captured by including levee maintenance in their utility
function as described in subsection 3.3.5.
-13-There are also non-￿nancial outcomes that a￿ect stakeholder utilities, including agricultural em-
ployment in the San Joaquin Valley, in￿ows to the Delta, and the possibility of ￿sh extinction. The
the role they play in stakeholder utility is discussed in subsection 3.3.5.
3.3.3. Stakeholder Uncertainty. All of the outcomes de￿ned above are contingent on the state of the
world s, which incorporates all of the uncertainty that stakeholders confront. This uncertainty is
due to the inherently stochastic nature of the linkages between policy decisions and their ultimate
impacts. One source of this uncertainty is scienti￿c controversy among experts, such as disagreement
about how ￿sh populations will respond to changes in water export regimes. Another source of
uncertainty is that certain payo￿-relevant events will not occur until the future: these include
the occurrence and timing of a major levee collapse, whether ￿sh species will recover, and whether
exports will be cut at some future time to aid the species’ recovery. The technical appendix presents
a detailed description of each of the components of our model that vary across states of the world
and their assumed distributions.12
There is one last source of uncertainty that plays a critical role both in the real-world policy
debate and in our model: how, exactly, will future export regimes be implemented? Here we
distinguish between the negotiated policy choice x that emerges from the political process￿we
call this the declared policy￿and the actual export regime in a particular state of the world. The
actual export regimes may in some states deviate from the declared policy for one of three reasons.
First, reductions in exports may be required in order to comply with the ESA. For instance, if
the political process agreed upon a thru-Delta solution with pre-2007 levels (around 6 maf), ￿sh
populations would quite likely continue their rapid decline. In some states of the world, the judicial
system would then intervene, mandating a signi￿cant cut in exports. In these states, actual exports
would diverge from the declared policy. Second, the institutions responsible for water management
may fail to implement the declared export policy for reasons that will be discussed in subsection
12Our approach is related to the one taken by Madani & Lund (2011a). Their Monte Carlo analysis draws from a
distribution similar to our distribution over states of the world. A key distinction between their analysis and ours
is that every draw from their distribution resolves all payo￿-relevant uncertainty: their two stakeholders face no
uncertainty in the games that they play; there is, however, uncertainty about which solution concept best represents
the true political situation (stakeholders’ behavior). By contrast, the ￿ve stakeholders in our model compare policy
alternatives to the default outcome on the basis of expected utility computations across possible states of the world.
A second, even more fundamental di￿erence is that we undertake this exercise for a large number of draws from the
set of possible values for all variables subject to modeling uncertainty.
-14-3.4. Finally, if a major levee collapse occurs, the post-disaster export regime may di￿er from the
pre-disaster export regime.
To model this relationship between declared export policy and the realized export regime, we de￿ne
the function g(x;s;zy), representing the actual export regime that results in state s from a policy
choice x, given the outcome parameter vector zy. As noted above, stakeholders’ utilities depend
on the outcome vector y, which depends in turn on the realized export regime: y(g(x;s;zy);s;zy).
Thus s can a￿ect the outcome vector both directly, through state-contingent values such as the
relationship between a particular export level and water supply costs, and indirectly, through its
in￿uence on the actual export regime.
3.3.4. The Default Outcome. The default outcome in our model has deterministic and random
components. If stakeholders cannot agree on a policy alternative in X then no major policy change
will be implemented. As a result, no canal will be built and no money will be spent on maintaining
the levees, so the probability of a massive levee failure will increase. The issue of primary concern to
stakeholders under the default outcome is the level of water exports in the absence of a massive levee
failure. This level is uncertain. As in the case of agreement, the actual level of default exports will
depend on whether or not ￿sh populations show signs of recovery and whether export reductions
are imposed if not.
Default exports are dependent on the future state of the world, and hence unknown to both stake-
holders and the modeler. The distribution describing stakeholder uncertainty is subject to modeling
uncertainty. Speci￿cally, we model default exports as state-contingent and treat the parameters
governing the distribution of the relevant state as components of modeling uncertainty. To re￿ect
stakeholder uncertainty, we write the default export regime as gd  
s;zd





. As always, we assume that stakeholders know the value of zd but not the
realization of the state of the world s; as usual, zd is a component of modeling uncertainty.
3.3.5. Stakeholder Utility. The following list introduces the arguments of each stakeholder group’s
utility function. The two letter code after each group’s title will be used as shorthand to identify
groups when we present our results. With the exception of environmentalists, each stakeholder
group has a CES utility function de￿ned over the components of the outcome vector that we assume
a￿ects its utility. Each group’s preferences over outcomes induce preferences over policy variables,
-15-although the linkages are not immediately transparent. Environmentalists are a special case. For
tractability, they are concerned exclusively about the survival of two ￿sh species, Delta smelt and
salmon. Because ￿sh survival is a binary variable, the CES speci￿cation we use for other groups is
inappropriate for environmentalists. Further discussion of the induced policy preferences is provided
in subsection 4.1.1 below.
State taxpayers (Tp): Taxpayers are concerned with reducing the government’s total ex-
penditure liability and are risk neutral. The two major (variable) determinants of the
government’s liability are the cost of levee maintenance, which increases with the amount of
water exported through the Delta, and the costs of a major collapse, borne only if a canal
does not exist. Thus Tp’s utility is increasing in xshr, decreasing in xex, and jumps up as we
move from xshr = 0 to xshr > 0.
Urban users (Ur): This group is an aggregate of urban interests in Southern California and
the San Francisco Bay Area. It is concerned with minimizing the cost of meeting its water
supply needs. Delta exports are cheaper than alternatives, so urban user utility increases
with xex. Moreover, both water treatment costs and the probability of cutbacks for ecosys-
tem protection increase as water exports are shifted from a canal to the Delta, so Ur’s utility
also increases with xshr.
Agricultural users(Ag): This group includes farmers in the San Joaquin Valley who rely on
water exported through the Delta. The two arguments in Ag’s utility function are farming
pro￿ts and the level of agricultural employment. Ag’s preferences are very similar to those
of Ur, although Ag’s utility decreases faster than Ur’s as xex falls since Ag’s pro￿ts and
agricultural employment both decline.
In-Delta interests: (Dt) This group is a composite of local residents, farmers, and recre-
ational users within the Delta. The two arguments of Dt’s utility function are Delta in￿ows
and levee maintenance. The ￿rst argument proxies the quality of water in the Delta, which is
highly correlated with Delta in￿ows. In the absence of a canal, Delta in￿ows are determined
by factors exogenous to our model￿hydrological variables and upstream diversions. If a
canal were built, then any water exported through it would reduce in￿ows into the Delta.
The second argument, levee maintenance, is a function of the amount of water exported
through the Delta: any agreed-upon policy package will allocate funds for levee maintenance
-16-according to a formula that increases with through Delta exports. Both impacts imply that
Dt’s utility decreases with xshr. The impact of increasing xex depends on the value of xshr.
At high values of xshr increasing exports reduces Dt’s utility due to reduced in￿ows; at low
values of xshr, Dt’s utility increases with exports due to increased levee maintenance.
Environmentalists (Ev): Ev is concerned exclusively with the survival of two ￿sh species:
Delta smelt and salmon. We de￿ne four state-dependent utility levels for Ev, similar to
Woodward & Shaw (2008). If both species survive, its utility is 1; if neither survive it is
zero. If only one of the two species survive, its utility is some number between 0 and 1,
depending on which species survives. Ev’s expected utility thus increases as the probability
of survival increases and hence decreases with xex. The impact of xshr is more complex and
is discussed in detail in section 4.




















3.3.6. Modeling Uncertainty. The elements of the parameter space Z that are components of model-
ing uncertainty include parameters specifying the distribution over the states of the world that relate
to the default outcome, the environmentalists’ payo￿s when only one species survives and, for each
of the other groups, its level of risk aversion, its elasticity of substitution, and the relative weights
that it assigns to di￿erent objectives. The remaining components of Z are parameters known to
both stakeholders and the researcher, which are modeled as degenerate random variables. A list of
these is provided in the technical appendix. Table 2 lists each non-degenerate element of Z and the
upper and lower bounds on the interval of values considered plausible for each one. Since we have
no basis for specifying an informative prior over these intervals, the principle of insu￿cient reason
dictates that each element should be independently and uniformly distributed over the interval we
specify as its support.
-17-Table 2. Elements and Distribution of Modeling Uncertainty
Variable Lower Bound Upper Bound
Weight on jobs vs money in Ag utility 0.2 0.8
Weight on maintenance vs in￿ows in Dt utility 0.2 0.8
Constant in Dt utility 0.05 0.15
Ag elasticity of substiution 0.5 1.5
Dt elasticity of substitution 0.5 1.5
Ag risk aversion coe￿cient 0.2 1
Dt risk aversion coe￿cient 0.2 1
Ur risk aversion coe￿cient 0.2 1
Ev utility if only smelt survive
 0.25 0.75
Ev utility if only salmon survive
 0.25 0.75
Spread of default export distribution above and below mean (maf) 0 2
 Ev utility is scaled so that 0 represents the utility if neither species survives and 1 represents the
utility if both survive.
3.3.7. Probabilistic Viability of Delta Solutions. Section 2 (equations 3 and 4 respectively) de￿ned
W(z), the Pareto dominant set (PD) given a particular realization z of ~ z, and V(x), the probability
with respect to modeling uncertainty that the policy x belongs to the Pareto dominant set. Note
that for any given z the payo￿-relevant characteristics of each policy alternative x are uncertain
because the state of the world is unknown. There are two sources of randomness. First, as discussed
in subsection 3.3.3, the total level of exports and the share ￿owing through the canal are state-
dependent. Second, for any realized level of exports, there is uncertainty about how this level will
map into payo￿ relevant outcomes. However, for any given z the PD set itself is deterministic￿a
policy is either dominated in expectation by the default for at least one player or it is not.
3.4. Institutional Mistrust. As noted in subsection 3.2, many groups, including in-Delta interests
and some environmentalists, have repeatedly expressed concerns that if the total capacity available
for exports were increased by building a canal, this entire capacity would be maximally utilized,
regardless of the declared level of exports.13 This concern has been exacerbated by calls from
engineers to choose its capacity to match engineering constraints rather than to implement any
particular export level. The engineering reasons for this approach are compelling: a large canal
13Blogger Dan Bacher voices a widely held view: ￿Although the Delta Vision Task Force’s report recommended that
less water be exported out of the Delta to help the estuary’s collapsing ecosystem, canal opponents note that the
construction of a canal with increased water export capacity would inevitably be used to export more water out of
the system.... I have repeatedly asked canal advocates to give me one example, in U.S. or world history, where the
construction of a big diversion canal has resulted in less water being taken out of a river system. I have also asked
them to give me one example, in U.S. or world history, where the construction of a big diversion canal has resulted
in a restored or improved ecosystem. None of the canal backers have been able to answer either one of these two
questions.￿ Bacher (2009)
-18-would provide maximum ￿exibility to time export ￿ows during the least environmentally damaging
time periods. However, the approach would build in substantial excess capacity, fueling fears of
exports greater than those agreed upon.
We model the impact of institutional mistrust on the political process in a stylized way by intro-
ducing an additional state-dependent variable: with probability  2 [0;1], water users will convince
regulators to ￿ll the canal to its capacity level at all times; with probability 1 , the canal will be
operated in accordance with the declared policy x. As with any other component of s, stakeholders
take expectations over the possibility that export level commitments are not honored; the magni-
tude of  is another component of the distribution parameter zs, which is known by stakeholders.
Section 4 considers the comparative statics e￿ect on political viability of increasing the value of .
More precisely, it examines how the upper and lower contour sets of V(z;) vary as the degree of
mistrust increases.
4. Results
The ￿rst set of results focuses on the set of policies that Pareto dominate the default outcome for
one particular realization of modeling uncertainty, namely the expected value  z =

Z zf(z)dz of
the random variable ~ z with respect to modeling uncertainty. For this parameterization, we increase
mistrust , and examine the changes in size and location of the Pareto dominant (PD) set, W( z;)
(see eq. 3). We then introduce modeling uncertainty into the analysis, and examine the probabilistic
properties of the PD set over a wide range of alternative parameterizations by classifying policies
according to the probability with respect to modeling uncertainty that they dominate the default
outcome. We use graphical methods to summarize our results and illuminate the relationship
between our probabilistic set measures and institutional mistrust.
4.1. One realization of modeling uncertainty. Having ￿xed the parameterization vector  z, we
use Monte Carlo methods to identify the PD set. We draw a large sample from the space S of states
of the world in accordance with the distribution h(; zs). For each policy vector x in a ￿ne grid
of points in the policy space X and each realized state s in the sample, we compute stakeholder
group k’s utility uk (x;s; z) from x given s, and conditional on the parameter vector  z. We then
average uk (x;; z) over our sample to obtain the expected utility Euk (x; z) that k derives from x.
















































We repeat this approach to compute k’s expected utility, Eud
k ( z) from the default outcome. This
exercise identi￿es the PD set W( z).
4.1.1. Perfect Trust. Initially, we analyze the PD set assuming institutions are perfectly trusted by
stakeholders, i.e. that  = 0, and identify W( z; = 0), which is the shaded area in Figure 1. The
boundaries of Figure 1 coincide with the boundaries of the policy space. Moving from left to right
in the diagram, the total amount of water exports, xex, increases; moving from the bottom to the
top, the percentage of the exports ￿owing through the canal, xshr, increases.14 The ￿lled circles
in the ￿gure are stylized depictions of the four policy alternatives discussed in detail in the PPIC
report.
Each contour line depicted in Figure 1 represents the participation constraint for one of the stake-
holder groups, i.e., the set of policy options which yield that group an expected utility level equal
to its expected utility from the default outcome. The arrows attached to each constraint line are
gradient vectors, pointing into the region of the policy space which the stakeholder group prefers to
the default.
The shapes of the participation constraints in Figure 1 re￿ect the preferences of the various stake-
holder groups. Ag and Ur will veto policies that involve low levels of exports. Both groups will trade
14Note that the volumetric distinction between vertically di￿erentiated points shrinks to zero as their horizontal
location moves to the left of the diagram: in the limit, obviously, there is no distinction between di￿erent fractions
of zero.
-20-slightly smaller total exports for larger shares through the canal, but are concerned primarily with
achieving a high base level of exports; consequently, their participation constraints slope steeply
downward. They will also veto policies with very low shares through the canal, because they will
not ￿nd it worth the cost of constructing the canal.Tp will veto policy vectors in the lower right
corner of the space, since it is in this region that the levels of exports through the Delta, and hence
expenditures on levee maintenance, will be the highest. Ev will veto policies that involve high levels
of exports, although this group is more willing to accept exports if they are routed at least partially
through the canal. This re￿ects the conclusion in Lund et al. (2008) that ￿sh populations are more
likely to recover under either a dual conveyance or pure peripheral canal option than if exports are
pumped exclusively through the Delta. The precise shape of Ev’s participation constraint is due
to the speci￿cation of the ￿sh survival probabilities and the assumption that the dual conveyance
option splits exports equally between the canal and the Delta. For Dt, the two outputs which
matter￿freshwater in￿ows to the Delta and expenditures on levee maintenance￿both decrease
with exports through a canal; hence Dt will veto policies in the uppermost region of the policy
space. Dt will accept even very high levels of xex, provided xshr is su￿ciently low because levee
maintenance expenditures increase with total exports. As xex increases, there is a decline in the
maximum level of xshr that is acceptable to Dt. It is surprising that Dt is willing to accept such a
large fraction of the available alternatives, since Delta interests have always vociferously opposed
a canal. The reason is that these alternatives are being compared to a default outcome that is
extremely unsatisfactory in expectation: unless some kind of agreement is negotiated, expenditures
on levee maintenance will be minimal, increasing the probability of a major levee collapse, which
would be devastating to Dt.
As noted in subsection 3.3.2, there is a discontinuity in the mapping from policies to expected
utilities when xshr = 0. We assume that if a canal exists, all exports will be routed through it in
the event of catastrophic damage to Delta levees. Thus the state-contingent costs and bene￿ts of
a canal change discontinuously at xshr = 0. This re￿ects an important discontinuity in the real-
world political-economic landscape: if a canal is built, it will have a very high option value, even if
xshr  0. Moreover, the size of the canal that will be constructed is independent of xshr provided
that xshr > 0. In the absence of an alternative conveyance option, a major levee collapse will lead
to one of two outcomes: either a canal will be built or extensive levee repairs will be undertaken.
-21-The high cost of these emergency response options implies that the maximum level of xex (and
thus the maximum level of regular levee maintenance expenditures) that Tp will accept falls when
xshr = 0. The possibility of rebuilding the Delta levees and continuing through Delta exports also
creates a discontinuity for Ev: For any given level of xex, ￿sh survival probabilities are lowest when
the realized share through the canal is zero (i.e., all exports ￿ow through the Delta). We assume
that if xshr > 0, all exports would with probability one be shifted exclusively to a canal following
a disaster; in contrast, if xshr = 0, exports will, with positive probability, continue to be routed
exclusively through the Delta, with strong negative implications for ￿sh survival probabilities. In
short, even if a canal would be used only in the event of a disaster, its existence would contribute
signi￿cantly, in expectation, to ￿sh survival probabilities. For this reason, the maximum level of
xex that Ev will accept falls discontinuously when xshr = 0.
The shaded region in Figure 1 is the PD set at the mean level  z of modeling uncertainty. Note ￿rst
that this set is nonempty, i.e., there do exist policies that Pareto dominate the default. This suggests
that that if the model, when parameterized by  z, is a reasonable stylization of the actual political
process, then we cannot rule out the possibility that some negotiated solution will emerge from the
political process. Moreover, for this parameterization, two necessary conditions for a policy to be
acceptable to all stakeholders are that total exports will not exceed the pre-2007 level of 6 maf, and
no more than half of all exports will ￿ow through the Delta. Finally, under this parameterization
at least three of the four options identi￿ed by the PPIC report would be vetoed by some group.
Whether or not the fourth option￿dual conveyance￿would be vetoed depends on how the option
would be implemented.
4.1.2. Impact of Mistrust. This subsection evaluates the consequences of institutional mistrust by
comparing the PD sets, W( z;), for four levels of  2 f0;0:2;0:4;0:6g, representing the probability
that the canal will be ￿lled to capacity. We restrict our attention to just one parameterization of the
model,  z. Figure 2 is the analog of Figure 1 for all four levels of mistrust. The ￿rst panel replicates
Figure 1. The percentage number printed inside of each set W( z;) indicates the size of this set
relative to the entire policy space. The location of each number roughly indicates the center of the
corresponding set.
-22-Figure 2. Impact of mistrust on the location of PD set with parameterization  z























































All of the costs for which Tp is responsible are independent of the level of mistrust, so the group’s
participation constraint is independent of the level of mistrust. The successive increases in mistrust
induce shifts in all other stakeholders’ participation constraints, and, hence the location and size of
the PD set. At higher levels of mistrust, Ag and Ur are willing to accept lower levels of declared total
exports because the expected actual level of exports (and shares through the canal) will increase.
Ev’s participation constraint moves to the left for the same reason. It also exhibits an increase in
curvature that is dependent on the speci￿c functional form for ￿sh survival and has little impact on
our results. The shift in Dt’s participation constraint as mistrust increases is particularly dramatic.
The change in its curvature between  = 0:2 and  = 0:4 can be traced to the change in the
shape of the contours of the expected actual share routed through a canal. Canal exports lower
-23-Dt’s expected payo￿ because the water is diverted upstream, thus lowering Delta water quality by
reducing freshwater in￿ows.
Due to the combined impacts of these shifts, the location and size of the PD set changes as mistrust
increases, as shown in Figure 2. As noted above, the participation constraints for Ag, Ur and Ev all
move to the left, causing the PD set to move left. At the same time, the size of the PD set increases
monotonically with mistrust, from 8% to 14% of the entire space. This result seems counter-
intuitive at ￿rst glance: one could interpret its size as a summary measure of the prospects for a
successful negotiation, and one would certainly expect that these prospects would be diminished in
the presence of mistrust. But this intuition does not take into account that there are gainers as
well as losers from mistrust. As mistrust increases, the constraints of the mistrusted groups slacken,
while those of the mistrusters tighten; the former are more willing to come to an agreement upon
which they may be able to renege; the latter are less willing to agree, because the agreement may
be reneged upon. The increase in size is caused by three factors. First, Ag’s and Ur’s constraints
are shifting left at a signi￿cantly faster rate than Ev’s, increasing the width of the PD set. The
second e￿ect plays the more signi￿cant role. The interaction between Tp’s and Dt’s participation
constraints causes the PD set to be much narrower at its right-hand edge than at its left-hand
edge. That is, at high levels of total exports, the interval of export shares that are acceptable to all
parties is much smaller than at low levels of total exports. As a consequence, even if Ev’s and Ag
and/or Ur’s constraints were to shift left with mistrust at the same rate, the PD set would increase
in size: a ￿short￿ column would be eliminated from the set, while a ￿tall￿ column would be added.
Finally,Dt’s constraint increasingly limits the set of possible agreements. When trust is not an issue,
Dt is a relatively obliging negotiating partner: the fraction of possible alternatives that this group
is willing to accept is clearly higher than that of any other group. But once the probability of a
trust violation reaches 0.6, the fraction of alternatives that Dt will accept is particularly small. The
model thus suggests that a critical factor driving Dt’s highly publicized opposition to the canal is
its strong belief that agreed upon restrictions on exports are unlikely to be honored in practice.
In addition to depicting the impact on the size of the PD set, Figure 2 illustrates that as mistrust
increases, the PD set moves down and to the left; the acceptable policies are characterized by fewer
total exports and a smaller share of those exports through the canal. The downward shift is driven
primarily by the shift in Dt’s constraint; the leftward shift by the shifts in Ag’s, Ur’s and Ev’s
-24-Figure 3. Expected export con￿gurations for parameterization  z
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constraints. The shift toward lower exports is not surprising, but this ￿gure tells only part of the
story, i.e., what happens to the levels of declared water exports in the PD set. As mistrust increases,
so does the probability that water exports will ￿ll the canal to capacity. Hence the reduction in
expected actual exports associated with alternatives in the PD set is less than the ￿gure would
suggest Indeed, expected actual exports could increase.
Figure 3 illustrates this point. It depicts how mistrust a￿ects the mapping from negotiated policies
to expected actual export con￿gurations.15 Each panel in Figure 3 is a contour plot: each solid
line is a locus of policy vectors for which the expected level of actual exports (top row) or actual
share through the canal (bottom row) is the labeled amount. Included as a reference, the solid
area in each panel is the PD set corresponding to , i.e. the set W( z;). With perfect trust, the
contours for expected actual exports in the top row of Figure 3 are nearly vertical lines; however,
each declared level implies a lower expected actual level because of the possibility of ￿sh-mandated
15Throughout this discussion of the mapping, we take expectations over only those states of the world for which a
major levee collapse does not occur.
-25-cutbacks. For any declared policy such that xshr > 0 and xex > 0, the corresponding expected level
of actual exports increases with mistrust; in the last column, expected actual exports are expected
to be nearly half the pre-2007 level even when the declared export level is almost zero.
Now consider the second row of Figure 3. With perfect trust, the contours are perfectly horizontal
and the declared and actual expected shares coincide. However, the actual share through the canal
increases considerably as mistrust increases because any exports exceeding negotiated levels would
￿ow through a canal. To see this, note that at low levels of declared total exports, very small
amounts would ￿ow through the Delta, whether or not commitments are honored; on the other
hand, if water users succeed in lobbying regulators to increase actual exports, large quantities of
water will ￿ow through the originally nearly empty canal, dramatically increasing the actual share
of total exports that ￿ows through it.
4.2. Probabilistic Pareto dominance. The preceding subsection examined the properties of the
model under one particular parameterization of modeling uncertainty. Many of these properties,
however, are determined by the interplay among a large number of parameters. To illustrate, recall
how in Figure 2 the size of the PD set increases monotonically with mistrust. Trends such as this
one depend on interactions between components of modeling uncertainty. A natural next step, then,
is to compile statistical information about the impact of mistrust based on a large sample of possible
model parameterizations. Accordingly, this subsection summarizes the data generated by repeating
the analysis in subsection 4.1 for 1,000 draws from the space of modeling uncertainty, Z. We ￿rst
assume perfect trust ( = 0) and evaluate the probabilistic political viability function, V(; = 0),
at each element of the policy space, X. We then repeat this process for the other three levels of
mistrust.
4.2.1. Perfect Trust. Figure 4 partitions X into regions depending on the probability that each
policy belongs to the PD set. A policy is termed robustly politically viable (RPV) if it Pareto
dominates the default for at least 80% of the realizations of modeling uncertainty; such policies are
marked in the ￿gure with the largest solid circles. Policies that are politically viable for at least
one parameterization are referred to as possibly politically viable (PPV). The PPV set includes all
of the points identi￿ed with some marker in the ￿gure. Finally, policies in the white (unmarked)
-26-Figure 4. Probability of Pareto dominance with perfect trust
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region are said to be never politically viable (NPV).16 The solid line is the boundary of the PD set
for the parameterization  z. The ￿gure is in some sense similar to Figure 1; both suggest that most
of the policies that have some chance of emerging from the political process involve export levels
less than pre-2007 levels, which are routed primarily but not exclusively through the canal. Yet
Figure 4 contains far more information than Figure 1.
One critical di￿erence between the two ￿gures is the interpretation of the unmarked regions of the
policy space. Policies in the unmarked region of Figure 1 are Pareto dominated by the default
for the single parameterization  z. By contrast, NPV (i.e., unmarked) policies in Figure 4 are
Pareto dominated by the default for all realizations of modeling uncertainty in our sample. A
striking property of the ￿gure is that all four policies singled out by Lund et al. (2008) are NPV. In
particular, all points on the graph’s left edge (corresponding to ceasing all exports) and its bottom
edge (corresponding to routing all exports through the Delta) are NPV. Lund et al. (2008) were
similarly skeptical of all no-canal alternatives, noting that despite its environmental bene￿ts, a policy
of stopping all exports is simply too expensive for the state, while continuing to rely exclusively on
through Delta exports carries unacceptable risks to both water supply reliability and the ecosystem.
Moreover, our analysis suggests all points on the top edge of the graph (corresponding to pure canal
alternatives) are also NPV. These alternatives are always vetoed by at least one stakeholder. If
16Using the terminology de￿ned in subsection 2.3, our vector of probability thresholds is given by  =
(0:0;0:1;0:4;0:8):The RPV set corresponds to C
+
4 ; the PPV set corresponds to C
+




-27-export levels are too low to justify the cost of construction, water users are unwilling to pay for
a canal. On the other hand, if export levels are too high, Dt will veto any pure canal alternative
because reduced Delta in￿ows cause two negative consequences: water quality in the Delta will
decline relative to the default and expenditures on levee maintenance will remain at zero. Finally,
our analysis suggests that a dual-conveyance alternative with pre-2007 exports evenly split between
a canal and the Delta is NPV, although other dual-conveyance con￿gurations are PPV.
The set of robustly politically viable policies in Figure 4 is considerably smaller than the shaded set
W( z;0) depicted in Figure 1, and bounded by the solid line in this ￿gure. While just under 9% of
the policy space belongs to W( z;0), less than 1% of the policy space is robustly politically viable.
Put another way, less than 10% of the policies inside the solid line are RPV, although almost all
of them satisfy the Pareto criterion with probability at least 40%. There is no policy which Pareto
dominates the default for more than 85% of the realizations of z. These data illustrate the obvious
point that inclusion in the PD set for the mean realization of modeling uncertainty is no guarantee
of robust political viability.
4.2.2. Impact of Mistrust. The ￿rst panel of Figure 5 replicates Figure 4; the remaining panels show
the impact of increasing mistrust. Legends for these ￿gures are the same as for Figure 4. In each
panel, we overlay for reference the boundaries of the shaded set W( z;) in the corresponding panel
of Figure 2. As mistrust increases, the set of PPV policies increases; this e￿ect is driven primarily
by slackenings in the participation constraints for Ag and Ur. As discussed in subsection 4.1.2, the
more likely it is that the canal will be utilized to capacity, the more willing Ag and Ur will be to
accept somewhat lower values of xex and xshr. The size of this e￿ect depends on how their utility
functions are parameterized. On the other hand, the set of robustly politically viable policies shrinks
dramatically, virtually disappearing even for  = 0:2. The ￿rst e￿ect is also apparent in Figure 2,
but the latter e￿ect contrasts with the increasing size of the PD sets in Figure 2.
Using modi￿ed box-and-whisker plots, Figure 6 demonstrates that the shrinking RPV sets are
caused by increased variation in the size and location of the PD sets. It summarizes for di￿erent
levels of mistrust the distribution of three measures of the PD set across modeling uncertainty: the
size of the set and the locations of its horizontal and vertical midpoints. The latter two measures
are, respectively, the means of the declared levels of exports and shares through the canal that
-28-Figure 5. Impact of mistrust on the probability of Pareto dominance
































satisfy the Pareto criterion for each vector z. In each panel, for each value of  the solid horizontal
line indicates the median value across our sample from Z for the measure being plotted. The thick,
squat rectangles denote 95% con￿dence intervals for the population medians. The thin, elongated
rectangles denote the interquartile ranges of the sample data, and the whiskers (thin, dashed lines)
indicate the support of the sample data. At the bottom of each panel, the ￿lled ovals corresponding
to each  indicate the probability that the PD set is empty; the area of the oval is proportional to
the percentage of parameterizations for which the PD sets are empty, given that level of mistrust.
As the left panel of Figure 6 illustrates, the median size of the Pareto set W(;) varies insigni￿cantly
with , while both the inter-quartile range and the support of the entire sample increase dramatically.
Obviously, the size variable is censored at zero, so the support cannot continue to move down in
later panels. Instead, there is a striking increase in the percentage of parameterizations for which
the PD set is empty. These fractions are negligible for low levels of , but increase dramatically for
-29-Figure 6. Distribution of set measures across modeling uncertainty

























































































































higher levels, reaching 30% when  = 0:6. Because the PD set is empty for such a high percentage of
parameterizations at this level of mistrust, a policy would fail the RPV criterion even if it belonged
to the PD set for every realization of modeling uncertainty. To summarize, the data strongly indicate
that the increased variation in the size of the PD set contributes signi￿cantly to the evaporation of
the RPV set seen in Figure 5.
The remaining two panels in Figure 6 con￿rm that the increased variation in the location of the
PD sets also plays a role. The trends in each locational median are large, negative and signi￿cant,
re￿ecting the shift down and to the left of the PPV sets in Figure 5; however, these changes do
not in￿uence the size of the PD set. Moreover, in the middle panel, we see that mistrust has little
impact on the horizontal dispersion of the PD sets; the lengths of the interquartile ranges and the
sample data support remain more or less constant as mistrust increases. However, in the right panel,
we see that the vertical dispersion of the PD sets increases with mistrust, especially at high levels.
This increasing vertical dispersion also plays a role in reducing the size of the RPV set. Because the
PD sets are located at increasingly varied vertical positions, it becomes harder for a given policy to
be in the PD set for a large number of draws.
-30-5. Conclusions
In this paper we develop a new methodology for predictive political economy modeling. The ap-
proach is designed to analyze complex, one-of-a-kind, real-world political negotiations. Our ultimate
goal is to make assessments about which policy outcomes might emerge from the political process.
In this context, economists face uncertainty about many critical components of the analysis, and
have no clear basis for selecting one particular model of the decision-making process. Our response
to this challenge is to analyze a large, parameterized family of models, and seek to identify out-
comes which are robustly political viable over a wide variety of possible speci￿cations. Lacking
su￿cient knowledge to specify which game-form best captures the real-world political process we
are modeling, we adopt a minimal predictive criterion￿Pareto dominance￿rather than impose any
one speci￿c game-theoretic solution concept.
We illustrate our approach by applying it to the current debate regarding the future of California’s
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta. This application is particularly suited to our mode of analysis.
It is characterized by a variety of the problems that plague political economists, including public
goods, missing markets, and tradeo￿s between noncomparable objectives. Commentators agree
that a political compromise cannot be implemented without the approval of a broad spectrum of
stakeholders; moreover, it is possible to conceive of a range of possible ways that the future may
unfold if a compromise cannot be reached. For these reasons, Pareto dominance is a well-de￿ned
concept, and is indeed a necessary condition for a solution to the problem. Finally, a small number
of potential solutions that have been identi￿ed as focal points of the policy debate. It is instructive
to use our methodology to assess the viability of these candidate solutions.
Our speci￿c results regarding the policy debate are consistent with the conventional wisdom. Many
experts agree that there is no hope that a consensus solution can be reached. Our analysis strongly
supports this wisdom: none of the most widely discussed options Pareto dominate the default for
any of the model speci￿cations considered. Moreover, only a very small number of policy options
meet the criterion of robust political viability. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, the analysis
identi￿es a broad range of options that do meet the standard for political viability for at least
a minority of the model speci￿cations considered. Under the conventional wisdom, an important
inhibitor of a consensus solution is stakeholders’ mutual mistrust. Our analysis illustrates that
-31-mistrust dramatically reduces the set of robustly politically viable policy options, although it also
increases the set of options which are viable with low probability. In particular, the impact of
mistrust is to reduce the political viability of solutions involving high levels of water exports, trans-
ported primarily through a new conveyance that bypasses the Delta. Thus, our analysis highlights
the importance of designing Delta governance institutions, which could potentially improve welfare
by reducing or limiting the extent of mistrust.
Our analysis also contributes to the broader political economy methodology literature. Researchers
in a wide range of ￿elds are concerned with how to address Knightian uncertainty. In contexts
characterized by this kind of uncertainty, there is little bene￿t to be gained from seeking to identify
the ￿right￿ model or the ￿right￿ solution. As we illustrate, it is potentially more productive to identify
a reasonable family of models and a set of candidate solutions that are robust with respect to a
wide range of model speci￿cations. Moreover, our approach illustrates the usefulness of complex,
yet still stylized, computable political economy models by demonstrating that they can aid in
identifying which model components are critical drivers of the model’s results, and which ones leave
its conclusions relatively intact.
References
Bacher, Dan. 2009. California’s Ghastly Peripheral Canal: Panama Canal North? Counterpunch.
Bay Delta Conservation Plan. 2007. The Bay Delta Conservation Plan: Points of Agreement
for Continuing into the Planning Process . Vol. 2009.
Bay Delta Conservation Plan. 2009. An Overview of the Draft Conservation Strategy for the
Bay Delta Conservation Plan. Vol. 2009.
Bay Delta Conservation Plan. 2010. Highlights of the BDCP. Bay Delta Conservation Plan.
Ben-Haim, Yakov. 2006. Info-gap decision theory: Decisions under severe uncertainty . 2nd edition
edn. London: Academic Press.
Blue Ribbon Task Force. 2007. Delta Vision: Our Vision for the California Delta. Tech. rept.
Blue Ribbon Task Force. 2008. Our Vision for the California Delta. 2 edn.
Cooley, Heather, Christian-Smith, Juliet, & Gleick, Peter H. 2008. More with Less:
Agricultural Water Conservation and E￿ciency in California, A Special Focus on the Delta .
Oakland, CA: Paci￿c Insitute.
Delta Vision Committee. 2008. Delta Vision Committe Implementation Report . Tech. rept.
Dessai, S., Hulme, M., Lempert, R., & Pielke Jr, R. 2009. Climate Prediction: a Limit to
Adaptation. Pages 49￿57 of: Adger, W.N., Lorenzoni, I., O’Brien, K.L., & Adgar, WN
(eds), Living with Climate Change: Are There Limits to Adaptation? Cambridge UP.
Ellsberg, D. 1961. Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
75(4), 643￿669.
Gilboa, I., & Schmeidler, D. 1989. Maximin Utility with Non-unique Prior. Journal of Math-
ematical Economics, 18(2), 141￿153.
-32-Gilboa, I., Postlewaite, A.W., & Schmeidler, D. 2008. Probability and Uncertainty in
Economic Modeling. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(3), 173￿188.
Hanemann, M., & Dyckman, C. 2009. The San Francisco Bay-Delta: A Failure of Decision-
making Capacity. Environmental Science and Policy, 12(6), 710￿725.
Hansen, L.P., & Sargent, T.J. 2001. Robust Control and Model Uncertainty. The American
Economic Review, 91(2), 60￿66.
Lempert, R., Nakicenovic, N., Sarewitz, D., & Schlesinger, M. 2004. Characterizing
Climate-Change Uncertainties for Decision-Makers. An Editorial Essay. Climatic Change, 65(1),
1￿9.
Lempert, R.J. 2002. A New Decision Sciences for Complex Systems. Proceedings of the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America , 99, Suppl 3, 7309￿7313.
Lempert, R.J., Groves, D.G., Popper, S.W., & Bankes, S.C. 2006. A general, analytic
method for generating robust strategies and narrative scenarios. Management science, 52(4),
514.
Lund, Jay, Hanak, Ellen, Fleenor, William, Bennett, William, Howitt, Richard,
Mount, Jeffrey, & Moyle, Peter. 2008. Comparing Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin
Delta. San Francisco: Public Policy Institute of California.
Lund, Jay R, Hanak, Ellen, Fleenor, William, Howitt, Richard, Mount, Jeffrey, &
Moyle, Peter. 2007. Envisioning Futures for the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta . Public Policy
Institute of CA.
Madani, K., & Lund, J.R. 2011a. A Monte-Carlo Game Theoretic approach for Multi-criteria
Decision Making under uncertainty. Advances in Water Resources, 34, 607￿618.
Madani, K., & Lund, J.R. 2011b. California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta Con￿ict: from
Cooperation to Chicken. Journal of water resources planning and management , in press.
Murphy, J.M., Sexton, D.M.H., Barnett, D.N., Jones, G.S., Webb, M.J., Collins, M.,
& Stainforth, D.A. 2004. Quanti￿cation of modelling uncertainties in a large ensemble of
climate change simulations. Nature, 430(7001), 768￿772.
National Research Council. 2011. A Review of the Use of Science and Adaptive Management
in California’s Draft Bay Delta Conservation Plan . Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
Piani, C., Frame, DJ, Stainforth, DA, & Allen, MR . 2005. Constraints on Climate Change
From a Multi-thousand Member Ensemble of Simulations. Geophys. res. lett, 32, 23.
Rasmusen, E. 2007. Games and information: An Introduction to Game Theory . Wiley-Blackwell.
Rougier, J. 2007. Probabilistic inference for future climate using an ensemble of climate model
evaluations. Climatic Change, 81(3), 247￿264.
Shaw, W. Douglass, & Woodward, Richard T. 2008. Why Environmental and Resource
Economists should care about Non-expected Utility Models. Resource and Energy Economics,
30, 66￿89.
Sinn, H.W. 1980. A Rehabilitation of the Principle of Insu￿cient Reason. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 94(3), 493.
Stainforth, D.A., Aina, T., Christensen, C., Collins, M., Faull, N., Frame, DJ, Ket-
tleborough, JA, Knight, S., Martin, A., Murphy, JM, et al. 2005. Uncertainty in Pre-
dictions of the Climate Response to Rising Levels of Greenhouse Gases. Nature, 433(7024),
403￿406.
United States District Court. 2007 (December). OCAP Final Interim Relief Court Order.
Walters, Dan. 2010 (August 11). Water Bond Violated Unwritten Capitol Rule. Sacramento Bee.
Woodward, R.T., & Shaw, W.D. 2008. Allocating resources in an uncertain world: Water
management and endangered species. American journal of agricultural economics, 90(3), 593￿
605.
-33-